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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTicL. 41-T AL BY JuRY
CPLR 4111(c): Case arising under CPA illustrates utility of CPLR
provision.
In Kennard v. Welded Tank & Construction Co.,159 an action was
commenced against the manufacturer of a water tank, Welded Tank &
Construction Co. (Welded), and a component part manufacturer,
Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (C.F. & I.), for injuries resulting from
the explosion of Welded's water tank. Welded thereupon cross-claimed
against C.F. & I. alleging breach of warranty. Subsequently, the jury
returned a general verdict against both defendants on plaintiff's
negligence claim, but returned special findings on the cross-claim
that C.F. & I. was not negligent.161 In response to motions by the
plaintiff and Welded to resubmit the case to the jury, or, in the
alternative, to order a new trial, the court, acceding to the mandatory
language of CPA 459,161 resolved the inconsistencies in favor of the
special findings, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim as well as Welded's
cross-claim against C.F. & I. On appeal, a divided court held that the
refusal of the lower court to resubmit the case to the jury or order a
new trial was not reversible error.
In drafting CPLR 4111(c), the legislature vested the trial court
with the discretion to direct the jury to further consider its answers or
order a new trial in lieu of directing a judgment in accordance with the
special findings. 0 2 Hence, as noted by the Court of Appeals, 63 the
problems presented by the Kennard facts should not recur under the
CPLR.
ARTICLE 71-REcovERY OF CHATTEL
CPLR 7102: Court vacates replevin since summons and complaint was
not promptly served upon defendant in possession.
Ancillary to an action for the recovery of a chattel, CPLR 7102
authorizes seizure of the chattel by a sheriff on behalf of the plaintiff
159 26 Misc. 2d 1000, 209 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961), af'd, 27 App.
Div. 2d 578, 277 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 197, 305
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1969).
160 The interrogatories were submitted to the jury in order to facilitate the trial
court's determination of third-party actions instituted by Welded against C.F. & I. Statu-
tory authorization for such interrogatories was provided by CPA 193-a(5), and is now
covered by CPLR 4111.
161 CPA 459 directed that "where a special finding is inconsistent with a general
verdict, the former controls the latter and the court must render judgment accordingly."
162 CPLR 4111(c). See SEcoNw REPoRT 235.
163 Kennard v. Welded Tank & Constr. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 253 N.E.2d 197, 199,
305 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (1969).
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
without requiring a court order.16 4 However, if an action is not then
pending, a summons and complaint must be served upon the defendant
in possession, before, after, or together with the writ of replevin.165
The failure to strictly comply with this provision does not affect the
validity of the replevin if the defendant thereafter becomes a party to
the action, i.e., makes a motion to reclaim or impound the chattel, or
gives notice of exception to the surety.166 Moreover, an untimely return
of proof of service by the sheriff may be cured by an order nunc pro
tunc.
1 67
In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Austin,16 the defendant moved to quash
a requisition on the ground that a summons and complaint had not
been served. In opposition the plaintiff contended that the motion was
improper since it was not expressly authorized under the CPLR. How-
ever, the court rejected this argument, holding that a practitioner may
always move to nullify a step illegally taken by his adversary. Further-
more, the court reasoned that limiting the defendant to the relief pre-
scribed under the CPLR could pose a constitutional dilemma in view
of his financial position. 1 9
On the merits, the court viewed the failure to serve the summons
and complaint as grounds to vacate the requisition. In the process of its
decision, the court expressed its disapproval with Kurzweil v. Story &
Clark Piano Co., 170 which held that the seizure of a chattel gave the
court in rem jurisdiction and consequently a judgment rendered
thereon was not void because of failure to serve a summons and com-
plaint. Rather, the court in Sears relied heavily on Devonia Discount
Corp. v. Bianchi,"" wherein the failure to serve a summons was viewed
as a defect which divested the court of jurisdiction. Although Devonia
is no longer considered valid as precedent in view of GPLR 7103 (c), 172
the court adopted its rationale since 7103(c) was inapplicable to the
facts in Sears. Thus, the court concluded that without proof of service
upon the defendant, the underlying action to recover the chattel must
164 CPLR 7102(f) provides that upon receipt of the requisite papers the sheriff shall
seize the chattel and unless within three days the sheriff is served with either a notice
of exception to plaintiff's surety, a notice of motion for an impounding order or the
necessary papers to reclaim the chattel, he shall deliver possession of the chattel to the
plaintiff.
165 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7102, commentary 390 (1963).
166 CPLR 7103(c).
167 CCA 411.
168 60 Misc. 2d 908, 304 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
169 Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1956).
170 95 Misc. 484, 159 N.Y.S. 231 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1916).
171 241 App. Div. 838, 271 N.Y.S. 413 (2d Dep't 1934) (per curiam).
172 FOURTH REP. 256.
[VOL. 4
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
be dismissed. And, without the underlying action, the replevin action
was no longer ancillary, and must therefore be vacated.
Although the defendant in possession of a chattel is protected to
a degree by his statutory right to reclaim173 or to move for an order
impounding the chattel, 174 and by the plaintiff's undertaking 75 it none-
theless is clear that sufficient notice must be afforded the defendant. 176
Thus, the refusal of the court in Sears to follow the Kurzweil holding,
which previously had been emasculated 177 and questioned, 78 serves as
a reminder to the practitioner to commence an action promptly when
seeking to avail himself of the ancillary remedy of replevin.
NEw Yomu CiTY CML COURT Aar
CCA 1908: Absence of express statutory authority is not a bar to recov-
ery of necessary litigation expenses.
It can hardly be denied that an examination before trial of an
adverse party has become a necessary procedure in the prosecution of
a lawsuit. Likewise, when circumstances so dictate, an interpreter at
the examination is equally as important. 79 However, the question arises
whether a victorious litigant in the New York City Civil Court can
recover disbursements for such expenses from his opponent.
In Santiago v. Johnson'"0 the plaintiff sought an order disallowing
expenditures of this nature as taxable costs on the ground that CCA
1908181 did not grant the authority for the assessments. Nevertheless,
recovery was permitted pursuant to the preamble of CCA 1908 which
limits the allowable disbursements as provided therein "[e]xcept where
the contrary is specifically provided by law ... ." And, the court held
that CPLR 8301(a)(9) was the specific provision allowing the recovery
of expenses of an examination before trial.
While the utilization of 8301(a)(9) is undoubtedly proper,8 2 its
adoption through the preamble of CCA 1908 is somewhat tenuous. In-
173 CPLR 7103(a).
174 CPLR 7103(b).
176 CPLR 7102(e).
176 Cf. Sniadick v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
177 Devonia Discount Corp. v. Bianchi, 241 App. Div. 838, 271 N.Y.S. 413 (2d Dep't
1934) (per curiam). See also Florence Trading Corp. v. Rosenberg, 128 F.2d 557 (2d Cir.
1942).
178 See 7A W. K. & M. 7102.02.
179 Cf. People ex rel Levy v. Grant, 37 Misc. 430, 75 N.YS. 290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1902).
180 61 Misc. 2d 746, 305 N.YS.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
181 CCA 1908 is the New York City Civil Court provision governing the allowance
of costs to a party in an action or appeal.
182 See 8 W. K. & M. 8301.27.
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